How costly is weak contract enforcement? Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants, we show that in states with weaker enforcement, as measured by judicial lags, production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted. We document that among plants in industries that tend to rely more heavily on inputs that require customization, those in states with more congested courts shift their expenditures away from intermediate inputs, whereas we find the opposite in industries that tend to rely on standardized inputs. To quantify the impact of these distortions on aggregate productivity, we construct a model in which plants have several ways of producing, each with different bundles of inputs. Weak enforcement exacerbates a holdup problem that arises when using inputs that require customization, distorting both the intensive and extensive margins of input use. and uses aggregation techniques pioneered by Houthakker (1955). We model the technology choice and choice of organization concurrently with the sourcing decision, motivated by evidence that increased access to intermediate inputs has a productivity-enhancing effect (e.g. Pavcnik (2002), Khandelwal and Topalova (2011), Goldberg et al. (2010), Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015)). Our paper is also closely related to the literature on misallocation in developing countries (see Hopenhayn (2014) for a survey). Several papers have extended the work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to settings in which distortions affect the the use of intermediate inputs, e.g., Jones (2013), Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2014), Fadinger, Ghiglino and Teteryatnikova (2016), Bigio and La'O (2016), Caprettini and Ciccone (2015), Liu (2017), Caliendo, Parro and Tsyvinski (2017). These papers typically posit industry-level production functions and use industry-level data. Our approach of identifying wedges from factor shares (in our case, intermediate input expenditure shares) extends the work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) along three key dimensions. First, we relate the estimated 2
Introduction
The last two decades of research have found that legal institutions play a key role for development. 1 This paper studies theoretically and empirically how weak legal institutions-more precisely, slow contract enforcement due to congestion of the courts-shapes the organization of production, and quantifies the importance of these frictions for aggregate productivity. While contracts can alleviate holdup problems, frictions that impede contract enforcement increase the effective cost of some inputs. These, along with frictions in the enforcement of employment contracts, affect firms' how firms organize production.
We study contract enforcement frictions in the context of the Indian manufacturing sector.
India is a country with infamously slow and congested courts: the World Bank (2016) currently ranks India 172th (out of 190) when it comes to the enforcement of contracts, behind countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (171th) and Zimbabwe (165th) . Around 6m of the 22m pending cases are older than five years, and while India's Law Commission has been advocating vast reforms for several decades, these reforms have not been implemented, and pendency ratios have not decreased. At the same time, India's liberalization and growth has spurred demand for timely enforcement of contracts.
Using detailed plant-level data from India's Annual Survey of Industries, we document several facts about how the quality of courts alters plants' input choices. While there is an enormous amount of heterogeneity in the input bundles plants use even within narrowly defined (5-digit) industries, 2 the bundles differ in systematic ways related to the quality of courts. To focus on these differences, we differentiate between inputs that are relatively homogeneous and standardized from those that require customization or are relationship specific, using the classification from Rauch (1999) . Users (or potential users) of relationship-specific inputs are most likely to benefit from better formal enforcement of supplier contracts.
Our first fact is that in states where courts are more congested, plants in industries that typ- To interpret these facts and to quantitatively evaluate their ramifications for aggregate produc-1 See Rajan and Zingales (1998) , La Porta et al. (1997) , Djankov et al. (2003) , Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , and many others 2 Some of this heterogeneity reflects different organizational and technological choices. As an example, a plant that produces frozen chicken may purchase live chicken and slaughter and freeze them; or it may purchase chicken feed, and raise, slaughter, and freeze the chicken on the same vertically integrated plant. Other examples indicate horizontal technological choices, e.g., the chicken producer could use a sophisticated machine that mechanically packages the chicken or use more basic implements. tivity and for the organization of production, we construct a multi-industry general-equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms and intermediate input linkages that form between them. Firms face a menu of technology/organizational choices ("recipes") and draw suppliers, match-specific productivities. Both primary inputs and relationship-specific inputs are subject to wedges that reflect weak contract enforcement. Each firm chooses the the production technique that minimizes effective cost. The cost delivered by any single technique depends on its productivity and wedge draws, but also on the production cost of the chosen suppliers. Wedges hence distort choices and build up along entire supply chains. Weak enforcement has a direct impact on producers that use inputs that require contract enforcement, but also may lead firms to switch to techniques that have lower productivity but do not require good courts.
To make quantitative statements, we structurally estimate technological parameters and distributions of wedges that distort the use of relationship-specific intermediate inputs and of primary inputs that are specific to each state. Our identification strategy exploits the idea that the quality of courts should have no impact on the effective cost of homogeneous inputs (which, if anything, is conservative). The identified wedges on relationship-specific intermediate inputs are strongly correlated with the observed speed of the regional courts, in line with the motivating reduced-form regressions. To alleviate concerns that higher court quality might arise endogenously from higher demand for formal contract enforcement, we use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits the historical origins and structure of the Indian judiciary.
Our preliminary results suggest that courts may be important in shaping aggregate productivity, and that reducing congestion in the most congested state to be in line with the least congested state would raise the state's aggregate productivity by roughly 10%. The overall wedges we back out are much larger, but it is less clear whether there is a policy that could improve the allocation further.
generally exists one for each state, and which have both appellate and original jurisdiction over cases originating from their state (and sometimes an adjacent union territory). High Courts are also administering the subordinate courts in their jurisdiction. The highest instance is the Supreme Court of India. All three instances are heavily congested, with district courts facing the additional problems that judges are often inexperienced and make erroneous decisions. While contract cases between firms should in principle be filed at the district level, litigants typically bypass this step by claiming an infringement of their fundamental rights or appealing to the constitution of India, in which case they are permitted to file the claim directly at a high court. 8 High Court judges, often taking a dim view of the subordinate judiciary, tend to accommodate this practice. The result is that the Indian judiciary is relatively heavy in its upper levels, with only the simplest cases being dealt with in the subordinate courts. 9 For the better or worse, it is the quality of the higher judiciary that determines whether and how contracts can be enforced.
We construct a measure of court quality from microdata on pending civil cases in High Courts, which the Indian NGO Daksh collects from causelists and other court records (Narasappa and Vidyasagar (2016) ). These records show the status and age of pending and recently disposed cases, along with characteristics of the case, such as the act under which the claim was filed or a case type categorization. Our measure of high court quality is the average age of pending civil cases in each court, at the end of the calendar year 2016. Whenever a high court has jurisdiction over two states and a separate bench in each of them (such as the Bombay High Court, which has jurisdiction over Maharashtra and Goa), we construct the statistic by state. We prefer this measure over existing measures of the speed of enforcement, such as pendency ratios published by the High Courts, which suffer from the problem that different high courts measure pendencies in vastly different ways (see Law Commission of India (2014)). Appendix ?? provides detailed information on the construction of our court quality variable, along with summary statistics. It also shows that our measure is correlated with other commonly used measures, such as pendency ratios.
The average age of pending civil cases varies substantially across high courts -from less than one year in Goa and Sikkim, to about four and a half years in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
The cross-state average is two and a half years.
The problems of the Indian judiciary are not a recent phenomenon, and have not gone unnoticed.
Throughout the modern history of India as an independent nation, the Law Commission of India has pointed out the enormous backlogs and arrears of cases (14th report, 1958, 79th report, 1979, 120th report, 1987, and 245th report, 2014) , and suggested a plethora of policies to alleviate the situation. The vast majority of these proposals have not been adopted, and the few exceptions seem to have had little impact. Overall, the backlogs have slowly but continually accumulated.
The main explanation for why court speed varies so much across states lies in the history of India's political subdivisions. The first high courts (Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta) were set 8 Some High Courts, such as the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Delhi, even allow civil cases to be filed directly whenever the claim exceeds a certain value.
9 Between 2010 and 2012, about 40% of all disposed cases in subordinate courts were related to traffic tickets, another seven percent related to bounced cheques (Law Commission of India (2014)). up by the British in the 1861 Indian High Courts Act, and served as the precursor for India's post-independence high courts. Upon independence, India was divided into a number of federated states, with the Constitution of India (1947) mandating a high court for each state. Throughout the twentieth century and beyond, India has frequently subdivided its states, often because of ethno-nationalist movements. These subdivisions were often accompanied with new high courts being set up, which then start without any existing backlog of cases. 10 The age of the high court is hence a strong determinant of its speed of enforcement (see Figure 1 ). We will later use the age of high courts as an instrument for its quality. Our industrial data is the Annual Survey of Industry (ASI), the official annual survey of India's formal manufacturing sector. The ASI is a panel that covers all establishments with more than 100 employees, and, every year, a fifth of all establishments with more than 20 employees (or more than 10 if they use power). The ASI's unique feature is that it contains detailed product-level 
Intermediate Input Use
We first turn to documenting the correlation between court quality and plants' intermediate input The relatively lower materials share suggests that these plants may be doing more of the production process in-house, as opposed to outsourcing it. A plant that produces cars might both manufacture and assemble its components in the same vertically intgrated facility. The regressions in Table II show this result formally. We first define a "vertical distance" between an output ω and an input ω as the average number of production processes required to turn ω into ω, weighted by the product of the input-output table materials shares along each production chain, and excluding any instances of roundabout production. 11 The left-hand side in the regressions in Table II is the plant's average vertical distance of its inputs from its output, weighted by each inputs's share in the plant's total materials expenditure. A higher values thus means that the plant produces its output using inputs that require on average more production steps (according to aggregate materials shares) to be turned into the output; the plant is more strongly vertically integrated. Table II shows that plants are on average more vertically integrated in states with worse courts if production relies heavily on relationship-specific inputs. 
Endogeneity, and the Historical Determinants of Indian Court Efficiency
The main caveat in the above regressions in the concern that there are unobserved covariates of court quality that may also affect the cost of firms' inputs, and thereby their input shares. The simplest version is reverse causality. In principle, the bias from reverse causality could be positive or negative.
Suppose that a state had, for exogenous reasons, many firms that produced using relationshipspecific inputs. The disputes that arise may cause the courts to be congested. Or alternatively, the state may respond to the disputes that arise and spend resources to reduce congestion. Either of these would be problematic for interpreting the regressions as a causal relationship.
While we believe reverse causality is unlikely to arise-the fraction of cases related to firm-tofirm trade is relatively low 12 -it is difficult to rule out other factors that may influence both court congestion and usage of relationship-specific inputs.
We therefore employ an instrumental variables strategy that uses the historical determinants of congestion. As discussed in Section 2.1, courts have been continually accumulating backlogs throughout the 20th century. At certain points in time, however, states were split or reorganized, mostly in response to ethno-nationalist movements. In the course of these reorganizations, new high courts were set up, which initially started with a clean slate but were, like existing courts, understaffed and started accumulating backlogs. The time since their founding-the court's age-is therefore a strong predictor for the current backlog, which in turn determines the present-day speed of enforcement. Our instrumental variable for the speed of enforcement is hence the (log) age of the high court, and the instrument for an interaction of an industry-level variable with court speed is the interaction of the industry-level variable with the log age of the court. Figure 1 in Section 2.1 shows the strong correlation between court age and speed of enforcement.
There are a few reasons that the exclusion restriction may be violated. We argue that two candidates would lead us to conclude that the true relationships are stronger than reported in the IV regressions. First, new states tend to be relatively poor and have low state capacity. Thus the usual concern that a high level of development causes firms to use more sophisticated technologies that use relationship-specific inputs would cause the newer states to have higher use of homogeneous inputs. Alternatively, it may be that when a state splits, many firms lose their suppliers and must switch. It is easy to find a new supplier of homogeneous inputs, whereas it might be harder to find a supplier of relationship-specific inputs. This channel would also cause newer states to be more intensive in homogeneous inputs. In either case, the true relationship would be stronger than reported.
Tables IV, V, and VI repeat the regressions from above using the instrumented speed of enforcement. The point estimates of the coefficient of the interaction term is usually slightly larger than in the OLS estimates.
Model
The previous section showed that imperfect contract enforcement alters the production decisions of manufacturing firms in India in systematic ways. We next aim to quantify the impact of weak enforcement on the productivity of the manufacturing sector. Our main identifying assumption is that imperfect contract enforcement distorts the use of relationship-specific inputs and of labor, but not the use of homogeneous inputs. Motivated by the reduced form evidence, we will ultimately identify the impact of the distortions by studying how patterns of firms' expenditure shares differ across states. 
Avg age of Civil HC cases -0.00547 * -0.00572 * * -0.00731 * * (0.0022) (0 However, several factors complicate the tasks of measuring distortions and assessing their impact. First, there are many ways to avoid contracting frictions. Suppose a firm needed to use an input that required customization and gave rise to a holdup problem. In the face of weak formal contract enforcement, the firm might buy the intermediate input from a cousin or rely on the repeated interactions of a long-term relationship. These decisions, however, may come at a cost. A family member may not be the optimal supplier of an intermediate input, and if a firm is in a long term relationship, it may pass up using new, more cost-effective inputs in order to remain in that long term relationship. 13 Such a firm's production cost is higher than it would be with better contract enforcement. Nevertheless, since the firm avoids the holdup problem, its expenditure shares will not be distorted. The higher production cost is an indirect consequence of weak formal enforcement. We can infer this indirect cost by incorporating such decisions in the model, albeit in a reduced form way.
Second, even in narrowly defined industries, firms produce in qualitatively different ways. As a simple example, consider two plants that both produce tires, one that buys rubber and another that harvests rubber itself. It may well be the case that the latter's decision to vertically integrate was a consequence of a distortion. But simply comparing the two plants' expenditure shares won't give a direct measure of the size of the distortion. Similarly, some shoe producers make the shoes by hand and others using sophisticated technologies. Fortunately the ASI provides an extremely detailed characterization of plants' input bundles. As such, one goal is to use an analytical framework that incorporates decisions of producing using alternative modes of production this feature of the data can inform the model and our measurement of distortions.
In the model, firms may produce using many inputs. Using some inputs gives rise to a holdup problem that can be alleviated with good contract enforcement. The model incorporates two ways that weak enforcement might cause firms to alter their production decisions. A firm might change the intensities with which it uses specific inputs, or it might switch methods of production altogether. There is a tremendous amount of heterogeneity across firms in the number, types, and cost shares of inputs used, even within extremely narrowly defined industries. Our model takes the stand that much of this heterogeneity is natural and would arise even in the absence of distortions, due to realizations of match-specific productivity differences. It will be useful to use all of the variation across those firms to help us identify model parameters. The natural heterogeneity gives rise to a structural error term in our estimating equations that we can interpret as arising from non-neutral productivity differences rather than distortions.
The Environment
There is a set of industries Ω. For industry ω ∈ Ω, there is a mass of firms with measure J ω that produce differentiated varieties. There is a representative household that inelastically provides a mass of labor with measure L and has nested CES preferences over all of the varieties in each industry, maximizing consumption of the bundle C defined as
where {υ ω } reflect the household's taste for different industry aggregates, η is the elasticity of substitution across industries, and ε ω is the elasticity of substitution across varieties in industry ω.
Each firm randomly draws many different ways of producing its good and suppliers from whom it may source inputs. In equilibrium, the firm produces using the combination of production function and suppliers that is most cost-effective.
There are many recipes that may be used to produce a good of type ω. A recipe, denoted by ρ ∈ ω , is a production function G ωρ (·) that can be used by a firm in industry ω to produce its good using labor and a particular bundle of inputsΩ ρ . 14 The only restrictions we place on the production function G ρ are that it exhibits constant returns to scale and that all inputs are complements. Note that the specification of the production function allows, e.g., for the first intermediate input to be more important than the second.
Assumption 1 For any recipe ρ ∈ ω , the production function G ωρ exhibits constant returns and all inputs are complements.
Firm j in industry ω has, for each recipe ρ ∈ (ω), a random set of techniques Φ jρ to produce using that recipe. A technique φ ∈ Φ ρ j is a variation on recipe ρ consisting of input-augmenting productivities for each input and a set of potential suppliers for each intermediate input. If a recipe uses the intermediate input bundleΩ = {ω 1 , ...,ω n }, then a technique would be characterized by its input augmenting productivities (b l , bω 1 , ..., bω n ) and the set of potential suppliers for each input Sω 1 , ..., Sω n . If j used that technique, its output would be
where l is labor and xω i is effective units of goodω i procured from the most cost-effective supplier in Sω i .
Each technique is specific to the firm producing the output (the "buyer") and the potential suppliers that might provide the intermediate inputs. Techniques within a particular recipe may differ in how intensively the particular inputs are used, as this depends on the input-augmenting productivities and the pries charged by the suppliers. The probability distribution governing the set of techniques with which firm j can produce ({Φ jρ } ρ∈ (ω) ) will be described below.
Each supplier in the set Sω is uniformly drawn from all firms that produceω. In addition, for each such supplier there is a random match-specific productivity, z.
Market Structure
Terms of trade among firms determine their choices of inputs, productions decisions, and productivity. Firms engage in monopolistic competition when selling to the representative household. We also assume that sales of goods for intermediate use are priced at the supplier's marginal cost. 15
Firms remit all profit to the household.
Contracting Enforcement
Enforcement of contracts facilitates the use of inputs that require customization and the use of labor.
Imperfect enforcement introduces wedges between the effective cost to the buyer and the payment to the supplier and between the effective cost of labor and the wage received by workers. The wedges takes the form of an iceberg cost. Appendix D.1 provides one microfoundation for modeling imperfect enforcement in this way, although there are other microfoundations that are equally plausible. We briefly describe the microfoundation here and refer the reader to Appendix D.1 for details.
If an input requires customization, the supplier can shirk and provide a good that is imperfectly customized to the buyer. If this happens, the buyer uses up output correcting the defect. This is wasteful because the supplier has a comparative advantage in performing the customization. Similarly, workers can steal output, but the effort required to steal is wasteful. Buyers, suppliers, and workers can write contracts that require perfect customization or prohibit stealing, but imperfect enforcement of these contracts implies that some of this misbehavior will occur in equilibrium.
While all parties anticipate equilibrium behavior and build this into prices, the behavior leads to a wedge that is isomorphic to an iceberg cost.
For each potential supplier of a relationship-specific intermediate input, there is a random input wedge t x ∈ [0, 1] that distorts the use of that input, drawn from a distribution with CDF T (t x ). If the supplier's price is p s , the effective cost to the buyer is ps tx . Similarly, if production is subject to the labor wedge t l , then if a worker receives the wage w, the effective cost to the firm is w/t l .
The distribution T (t x ) summarizes the quality of enforcement. Perfect enforcement of contracts would imply that T (t x ) = 0 except for t x = 1. We interpret worse enforcement as a stochastically dominated distribution of wedges.
Discussion of Assumptions
Before analyzing the equilibrium outcomes, we pause to discuss some of the modeling choices we have made and how we interpret some of the assumptions. First, as discussed earlier, courts are not the only way to enforce contracts; contracts could be enforced informally through social punishments or reputation. t x and t l should be interpreted as the wedges that prevail after all forms of enforcement are exhausted. For example, if formal enforcement would leave the wedge t formal Second, we model the wedges as random and specific to a supplier. First, as discussed earlier, for some suppliers (i.e., family members, those with whom the buyer is in a long term relationship) the possibility of informal enforcement may mitigate any hold-up problem. For others, the holdup problem may be more severe.
Third, we model the wedges as an iceberg cost rather than an implicit tax or subsidy as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . This is consequential, because iceberg costs use up resources whereas implicit taxes do not. An implicit tax may stand in for rationing or a Lagrange multiplier on a collateral constraint, and would raise the buyer's shadow cost of an input relative to the supplier's price without using up resources. In contrast, iceberg costs raise the buyer's shadow cost by wasting resources.
Both iceberg costs and implicit taxes would generate identical predictions consistent with the findings of Section 2. However, there is at least one observable dimension that we can use to distinguish between the two types of frictions. With implicit taxes, those subject to larger wedges should have higher ratios of revenue to cost. With iceberg costs, those subject to larger wedges should have weakly lower ratios of revenue to cost. 17 In Appendix B.3 we ask whether those firms that we believe are subject to larger wedges-those in industries that tend to use relationshipspecific inputs in states with congested courts-have higher or lower revenue-cost ratios. Our findings are consistent with iceberg costs: larger distortions are associated with lower revenue-cost ratios.
Production Decisions
For each technique, firm j draws a set of potential suppliers to provide each input. For each supplier, there is a match-specific productivity draw and a wedge, so that the effective cost of using that supplier would be ps zstxs . j's effective cost of inputω for technique φ is the minimum across all potential suppliers:
The unit cost delivered by a technique depends on the input-augmenting productivities and the effective cost of each input. Let C ωρ be the unit cost function that is the dual of the production function G ωρ , so that j's cost of producing one unit of output using technique φ would be
. Minimizing cost across all techniques, j's unit cost is
In words, firm j's unit cost equals that of the technique that delivers the lowest cost across all techniques of all recipes.
In this section, we specialize to particular functional form assumptions that prove tractable. The set of techniques available to each firm is random and governed by the following assumptions about the distributions input-augmenting and match-specific productivities. Assumption 2 describes the frequency of matches.
Assumption 2 For a each technique of recipe ρ, the number of suppliers of inputω with matchspecific productivity greater than z follows a Poisson distribution with mean
Assumption 2 implies above any threshold, match-specific productivities follow a power law. 18 Z ωω summarizes the level of these match-specific productivity draws.We will show later that the industry-level elasticity of substitution across groups of suppliers of the same inputs is ζ + 1.
The next two assumptions describe the input-augmenting productivities of a technique.
Assumption 3 For a firm in industry ω, the number of techniques of recipe ρ ∈ ω (which uses inputsΩ ρ = (ω 1 , ...,ω n )) with input-augmenting productivities that strictly dominate 19 b l , bω 1 , bω 2 ,...,bω n follows a Poisson distribution with mean
Assumption 4 There is a γ such that for each ω and each ρ ∈ (ω), such that for every recipe
18 This type of functional form assumption goes back to at least Houthakker (1955) , and versions of it are also used by Kortum (1997) , Jones (2005) , Oberfield (2018) , and Buera and Oberfield (2016) . Note that the expected number of matches for a technique is unbounded. Formally, an economy satisfying Assumption 2 can be thought of as the limit of a sequence of economies that satisfy more standard assumptions. To see this, suppose that the number of suppliers for an inputω for a technique of recipe ρ is given by a Poisson distribution with meanZ ωρω , and that for each such technique, the match-specific productivity is drawn from a Pareto distributions with CDF 1 − (z/z0) −ζ . Define the normalizing constant Z ωρω ≡ Z ωρω z ζ . An economy satisfying Assumption 2 can be thought of as the limit in which z → 0 holding Z ωρω fixed. In this limit, the number of matches per firm grows arbitrarily large, but the productivities associated with any single match is drawn from an arbitrarily poor distribution. The limit is well behaved because the probability of drawing a technique with match-specific productivities greater than z does not change as z → 0. 19 We say that a vector (x0, x1, ..., xn) strictly dominates the vector (y0, y1, ..., yn) if x0 > y0, x1 > y1,...,xn > yn.
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Assumption 3 says that the input-augmenting productivities of a technique follow independent power laws. B ωρ summarizes the level of these productivity draws. We take these to be primitives, although a deeper model might model them as resulting endogenously from directed search or from the diffusion of technologies across entrepreneurs that know each other.
Assumption 4 says that for each recipe, the sum of the power law exponents is the same, equal to γ. This restriction could be relaxed, but for reasons we will discuss later, we do not believe it is quantitatively important. We will show later that the industry-level elasticity of substitution across recipes is γ + 1. The restriction that γ > ε ω − 1 is necessary to keep utility finite.
It will be useful to decompose the power law exponents into two parts. For recipe ρ, define
Note that this implies that α ρ l + ω∈Ω α ρ ω = 1. Further, for some results, it will be useful to define
Second, it will be useful to define, for each firm j, the variable q j to the inverse of j's unit cost in units of labor, i.e., the ratio of the wage to j;s unit cost. We call q j firm j's efficiency. This
Finally, let F ω (q) be the fraction of firms in industry ω with efficiency no greater than q.
With these assumptions in hand, we now characterize the equilibrium. All proofs are contained in Appendix D Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the fraction of firms with efficiency no greater than q among those that produce good ω is
and κ ωρ is a constant that depends on B ωρ , {Z ωω }ω ∈Ω ρ , and technological parameters.
Proposition 1 shows that the distribution of efficiencies takes the simple form of a Frechet distribution with shape parameter γ ω and scale determined by Q ω . Q ω summarizes the level of efficiency in the industry; a higher Q ω improves the distribution in the first-order stochastic dominant sense.
(2) relates industry ω's efficiency to that of the industries that provide the inputs for each recipe and to t * x and t l , which summarizes the impact of imperfect enforcement on those that produce the inputs used in recipe ρ. t * x accounts for both the direct impact of the wedges, but also for the indirect impact: wedges might cause firms to switch to a technique with lower productivity or that uses more costly intermediate inputs.
(2) is a system of equations that implicitly determines each industry's efficiency, {Q ω } ω∈Ω .
Proposition 2 shows that these are sufficient to characterize aggregate productivity.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the household's utility is
We next turn to industry-level expenditure shares. The next proposition characterizes the aggregate share of total expenditures (on both intermediate inputs and labor) that is spent on each input among all firms that use a particular recipe.
Proposition 3 Suppose that assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold. Among firms that, in equilibrium, produce using recipe ρ, the share of total expenditures that is spent on inputs fromω ∈Ω ρ R is
the share of total expenditures that is spent on inputs fromω ∈Ω ρ H is
and the share of expenditures spent on labor is
.
Proposition 3 provides a relatively simple expression for the industry-level cost shares of each input among those using a particular recipe. In the absence of distortions, these factor share would depend only on technological parameters, not on the relative prices of the inputs. Thus at industry level, there would be a Cobb-Douglas production function. This extends the celebrated aggregation result of Houthakker (1955) who derived a similar result under the assumption that individual production functions are Leontief. 20 We require only that the production function exhibits constant 20 Jones (2005) Imperfect enforcement, on the other hand, reduces the expenditure share of inputs that require enforcement. Recall that imperfect enforcement drives a wedge between the effective cost to the buyer and payment to the supplier. The buyer's production decisions depend each input's effective cost, whereas the expenditures reflect the actual payment to each supplier.
Counterfactuals
The quality of contract enforcement can be summarized by the distribution of wedges T . Supposed that the quality of enforcement changed in such a way that the distribution of wedges changed from T to T . How would this impact aggregate productivity? Taking J ω and m ωρ as primitives 22 , the following proposition shows how one can compute the impact of such a change.
Let HH ω be the share of the household's expenditure on goods from industry ω in the current equilibrium. Among those of type ω, let R ωρ be the share of total revenue of those that use recipe ρ in the current equilibrium.
Proposition 4 If the quality of enforcement change so that the distribution of wedges changes from T to T , the change in household utility would be
and the change in industry efficiencies satisfy the following system of equations
The first part of the proposition states that to know how a change in court quality affects aggregate productivity, it is sufficient to know only the change industry efficiencies, Q ω Qω . In turn, the change in each industry's efficiency depends on the weighted average over each recipe of the change in the efficiency of the industries that supply inputs to the recipe along with the change in the wedges that distort production in that recipe (again, taking into account the direct and plant draws many Leontief production functions where factor augmenting productivities are drawn from independent Pareto distributions, then the envelope of those production functions is Cobb-Douglas. He then shows numerically that the result extends beyond Leontief to CES production functions when the factors are complements. Note that these are not aggregation results; these results apply at the level of a single firm.
21 Why complements? When inputs are complements, when the price of an input is higher, there are two offsetting effects on the industry cost share. The higher price raises that cost share on that input for any firm that uses the input. At the same time, firms that use that input more intensively are likely to shrink or switch to a technique that uses the input less intensively. When factor-augmenting productivities are drawn from independent Pareto distributions, these offset exactly and factor shares are unchanged. If inputs were substitutes, the two effects would push in the same direction, so that if the price of an input rose, its industry cost share would fall. 22 An alternative exercise is asking what would happen if J and m were allowed to evolve as well.
indirect impact of these wedges).
(3) describes a system of equations that implicitly characterize these changes in industry efficiencies.
While Proposition 4 describes exactly how a change in enforcement would alter welfare, it is instructive to study a perturbation of the distribution of wedges to show which features of the economy are important for determining the first order impact of a change of the quality of enforcement.
Corollary 1 The marginal welfare impact of a change in court quality is
HH ω d log Q ω and the change in industry efficiencies can be summarized by the following system of equations
One implication is that, to a first order, the change in utility resulting from a change in the quality of enforcement does not depend on γ or η.
The Role of Stochastic Distortions
The model captures the idea that buyer-supplier relationships differ susceptibility to imperfect contract enforcement. Some buyer-supplier pair is able to enforce contracts informally, or transact in such a way that avoids a holdup problem. As a reduced form, we modeled this by assuming that for each supplier, the buyer draws a wedge from a distribution that deteriorates when formal enforcement is less reliable. Given our identification strategy and conditioning on the data, the fact that wedges are stochastic and differ across suppliers raises the implied welfare loss from imperfect enforcement relative to what we would have inferred if we had assumed that the wedges were the same for each supplier of an input. Our identification strategy consists of measuring {t l ,t x } and then using these along with our functional form assumptions to compute t * x . Jensen's inequality implies thatt x is an upper bound for t *
x that is attained only if the wedge is the same for all suppliers. 23 23 Since t ζ ζ+1 is a strictly concave function of t, Jensen's Inequality gives
with equality only the distribution of tx is degenerate.
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Entry and Exit
In our benchmark model, we assumed that the number of producers of each product is given exogenously. Of course we would expect that if the formal enforcement improved, profitability would increase more in industries that rely more heavily on relationship-specific inputs. We do, in fact observe that as formal enforcement deteriorates, the number of firms decreases relatively more in the industries that rely more heavily on relationship-specific inputs. Thus it is likely the quality of enforcement affects firms' entry and exit decisions.
How would our estimates differ if firms could endogenously enter and exit? The answer depends on the specifics of entry and exit and the particular counterfactual. Consider the following two possibilities. First suppose firms were committed to enter, but could choose which industry to enter. Then the additional adjustment after formal enforcement improved would raise aggregate productivity even more than a benchmark model suggests. Second, suppose that firms were committed to producing in a particular industry but choose which state to locate in. Here, if formal enforcement improves in one state, aggregate productivity in that state would rise as firms for other states moved in. However, aggregate productivity in other states would fall as firms moved out.
This suggests that the response to nation-wide improvement in formal enforcement would differ from the response to a single state improving enforcement. Further, systematic differences across states in how the number of firms responds to cross-sectional difference in legal enforcement may not be informative about the economy's response to a nationwide improvement.
Identification and Estimation
Our main counterfactual of interest is how aggregate productivity and the organization of production would change if the quality of enforcement improved. We do this in several steps. We first parameterize the model using information from the ASI under the assumption that the quality of enforcement varies by state. We then project the implied quality of enforcement for each state on our measures of court congestion. Finally, we compute the gains from reducing congestion to the level prevailing in the least congested state.
Our most important identifying assumption is that weak enforcement may introduce a wedge in the use of inputs that require customization and in the use of labor, but not in the use of standardized inputs. Given our scheme for identification, we view this as a conservative assumption.
If the use of standardized inputs were also distorted by weak contract enforcement, then all of the wedges would be larger than the ones we infer.
Assumption 5 We impose that the following objects are the same across states: (i) the form of the production function for each recipe {G ωρ }; (ii) the power law exponents for the input-augmenting productivity draws for techniques of each recipe {β ρ l , β ρ ω 1 , ..., β ρ ωn }, and (iii) the power law exponent for the match-specific productivity draws, ζ R and ζ H .
We allow all other features of preferences and technology to vary freely across states. This includes absolute and comparative advantages in recipes, {B ωρ }, (ii) the measure of firms of each type {J ω }, (iii) the average level of match quality for every type of match {Z ωρω }, (iv) the households tastes, {υ ω }, and most importantly, the quality of contract enforcement, T , and t l .
In addition, we make a functional form assumption for the stochastic wedges that a firm draws for each supplier of a relationship-specific input. In particular, the reciprocal of the wedge is drawn from a Pareto distribution, where the shape parameter is specific to a state.
Using a Pareto distributions has several attractive properties. First, following the discussion in Section 3.3, contracts might be enforced formally or informally. If the probability that the formal wedge is no greater than t x is t τ formal d x and the probability that the informal wedge is no greater
, then the probability that the effective wedge is no greater than t
. 24 This will lead to a clean interpretation of the counterfactual of interest.
The following proposition shows a set of moments that we can use in a GMM procedure to estimate the model parameters Proposition 5 Let s Rj , s Hj , s Lj be firm j's spending on relationship-specific inputs, homogeneous inputs, and labor respectively as shares of its revenue. Under Assumption ??, the first moments of revenue shares among firms that produce ω that, in equilibrium, use recipe ρ satisfy:
Our algorithm for identification is thus as follows:
1. Identify recipes (see next section for details). 25 2. Use Proposition 5 to estimate the production parameters that are common across locations
3. To compute t * x for each state, we first estimate ζ R externally and our estimates oft x along with Assumption 6 to compute t * x .
4. For the counterfactual, we also need values of the industry-level output elasticities of each input for each recipe, {α ρ ω }. To do this, we For each recipe, pool data across states to estimate the remaining production function parameters, αω, by using the aggregate expenditures. For example, if the sourcing industryω is relationship specific, then α ρ ω is equal α ρ R multiplied by the ratio of total expenditure on inputω by those that use recipe ρ to total expenditure on relationship-specific inputs. 24 This follows from the fact that the Pareto family is closed under the minimum operation. 25 It would be preferable to identify the recipes and the wedges simultaneously. We are working on this.
22 5. For each state-recipe, directly measure the share of revenue among firms {R ωρ }, and for each state, directly measure {HH ω }.
6. Calibrate η and γ externally.
In addition to this, we make several auxiliary assumptions that, in principle, could be relaxed.
First, we assume that there is no trade across state borders. While it would be fairly straightforward to incorporate interstate trade, we lack the relevant data. 26 A second assumption is that the recipes used by multi-product firms and the distribution of wedges facing them are the same as those of single-product firms. This type of assumption, while strong, is standard in the literature (see ....), as we lack the data that indicates which inputs are used in the production of which products.
Third, we treat service inputs and energy inputs as primary inputs.
Defining recipes
One of the salient facts of the Indian manufacturing data is that even within narrow industries, plants are using vastly different combinations of intermediate inputs to produce the same output.
Our model provides a natural way to think of these input-output combinations as different recipes ρ ∈ ρ(ω) that could be used to produce the same output ω. In order to use estimate the model from the microdata, we need a procedure that classifies each plant-year observation into which recipe the plant is using.
The idea that guides our classification is that, for a given output good, similar input mixes should belong to the same recipe. We describe each plant j's input mix by the vector of its input expenditure shares, (m jω ) ω∈Ω = (X jω / ω X jω ) ω∈Ω . Graphically, each vector corresponds to a point in the |Ω|-dimensional hypercube that is lying on the hyperplane where the sum of all coordinates equals to one. Our task is to find plants with similar input mixes, i.e. clouds of points that are close to each other (according to some metric). In statistics, this task is known as cluster analysis, and there is a large number of algorithms that classify clusters based on distance, density, shape, and other criteria.
Our preferred method is due to Ward (1963) , and constructs clusters recursively, starting with the partition where every cluster is a singleton. In each step, two clusters are merged to minimize the sum squared errors:
where the ρ n are partitions of J ω , and in each step ρ n runs over all partitions that are coarser than ρ n−1 . This method constructs a hierarchical set of partitions of J ω : one for each desired number of clusters.
Our implementation of the clustering procedure to identify recipes uses not only the five-digit materials shares, but also three-digit shares to allow for the possibility of misclassification of inputs within three-digit baskets. We set the number of potential recipes to n log((#Observations) w ) , for varying parameters n. This allows industries with more plant-year observations to have more recipes. We inspect the cluster hierarchy and choose n = 1.5, where we find that the resulting recipes correspond well to different modes of organization. Table 4 .1 shows statistics on the number and size of clusters (recipes) that we define.
To give a example of the usefulness of our procedure, Table 4 .1 shows the resulting recipes for product 63303 (bleached cotton cloth), which correspond to different ways of producing bleached cotton cloth: either by weaving bleached cotton yarn (recipe 1), by bleaching and dyeing greige cloth (recipe 2), and by weaving and bleaching unbleached cotton yarn (recipes 3 and 4). "Products" are the 5-digit ASIC codes in our data, "Recipes" are the output from our clustering procedure. Plant counts include only single-product plants.
Quantitative Results (Preliminary)
We estimate thet ρd x ,t ρd l , α ρ R , α ρ H , and α ρ L from the moment conditions in Proposition 5 using GMM subject to the constraints that α ρ i ≥ 0, α ρ R + α ρ H + α ρ L = 1, andt ρd x ,t ρd l ∈ (0, 1]. To identify the level of thet i , we set the largestt x andt l , respectively, to one, thereby making the (conservative) assumption that the least distorted state in each distortion is undistorted. Figure 4 shows the correlation between the estimated κ d x = 1/t d x and the quality of high courts as measured by the average age of pending civil cases. In states with slower courts, firms face larger distortions κ x when sourcing relationship-specific intermediate inputs. The solid line is the fit of an OLS regression of κ x on court quality; the dashed line the fit of an IV regressions where we instrument court quality using the log age of the high court. The estimated IV slope coefficient is similar to the one in the OLS.
To back out the wedge distribution parameters τ d
x from thet x , we need an estimate of ζ R , the tail parameter of match-specific productivity draws for relationship-specific inputs. This parameter also governs the elasticity of substitution across sets of suppliers. We estimate it as the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestically sourced inputs in a pair of inputs and outputs: 
Estimated kappa_x
The figure shows the correlation between 1/t ρ x and the average age of pending civil cases in the state's high court. The solid line is the OLS regression line; the dashed line is fit of an IV regression where the age of pending cases is instrumented using the log age of the high court.
where ι iωt is the import tariff on i at time t, and the λ's are fixed effects. Table IX shows the results for this regression. We use the point estimate of 0.214 for ζ R .
We then perform a counterfactual where we reduce κ d x = 1/t d x for each state by the amount that is implied by the OLS regression in Figure 4 , down to a point where the average age of pending cases
is one year (which is roughly the level of court quality enjoyed by the best state, Goa). Using our estimate for ζ R , we back out τ x at the original and counterfactual level, and compute the change in the welfare-relevant moment t * = (τ x /(ζ R + τ x )) 1/ζ R . We then simulate the corresponding change in household's utility aggregate as given by Proposition 4. For the counterfactual, we calibrate the household's outer-tier utility to be Cobb-Douglas in the industry baskets (η = 1), and choose γ = 1, which amounts to a first-order approximation of the change in the efficiency levels Q ω . We set the consumption aggregator's expenditure shares on each product to be calculated from the nonnegative part of the difference between total sales and total intermediate input purchases in the pooled data (and the fraction of that difference in the sum over all products). Inputs which do not
show up in our data as outputs are assumed to have unchanged productivity distributions. Figure 5 shows the counterfactual increase in the household's consumption aggregate U . The numbers are in the range of zero to more than ten percent, suggesting that the gains from improving contract enforcement institutions can be large.
Conclusion
This paper studies the organization of production in the Indian manufacturing sector, and how it relates to the quality of formal contract enforcement institutions. We make two main points: one about the within-industry heterogeneity and measurement of the organization of production, and a second one on how institutions are shaping it.
Firstly, we show that there is considerable amount of heterogeneity in technology and organization even within narrowly-defined industries. These differences should be reflected in the level of aggregation at which researchers assume a homogeneous shape of the production function. We argue that information on input use can be helpful in understanding differences in organization and technology within industries: a plant that produces cotton cloth from raw cotton is vertically integrated and performs both spinning and weaving, whereas a plant that produces cotton cloth The figure shows the counterfactual increase in U when the wedges on relationship-specific inputs are reduced according to the fraction of 1/tx that is explained by court quality in a linear regression.
from cotton yarn will only perform the weaving, and might therefore have different factor intensities. We provide a simple and flexible way of defining homogeneous technologies using a statistical clustering algorithm.
Secondly, we find that the organization of production is shaped by the contracting environment i We find that slow enforcement of contracts impedes the use of relationship-specific materials.
As a result, firms tilt their input basket towards the use of more standardized inputs, for which spot markets exist, and for which enforcement by courts in not necessary. Firms also respond by performing a larger chunk of the value chain within the plant. We develop a multi-industry general equilibrium model where firms source multiple inputs and choose the organizational form optimally to minimize the cost of production. We estimate the relative distortions associated with the use of relationship-specific inputs from first moments of cost shares, which, compared to the standard approaches of estimating input wedges, is more robust to potentially imprecise measurement of input use. Preliminary results suggest that the fraction of the distortions that is associated with poor courts is sizable and implies substantial welfare gains if courts were improved: for each year reduction in the average age of pending cases, the state's aggregate productivity would increase by about three percent.
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B Robustness / Further results
B.1 Two facts about the intra-industry variation in materials shares
Fact 1: Intermediate Input shares vary substantially across plants even within narrowly defined industries. Figure 6 shows the dispersion of materials shares -the fraction of expenditure on materials intermediate inputs in total cost -around their 5-digit industry mean. The average standard deviation of materials shares is 17 percentage points. Similar dispersion arises when using the share of materials expenditures in the value of production output, or in sales. Of course, these differences in materials shares within industries are not evidence for inefficiencies per se: differences in input prices, production technology, and organizational choice, as well as measurement error could be driving this variation. Fact 2: The dispersion of materials shares is higher in industries that rely heavily on relationship-specific intermediate inputs. Figure 7 compares the intra-industry distribution of materials shares by the industry's dependency on intermediate inputs that are not traded on an organized exchange, or whose price is listed in trade publications ("relationship-specific" inputs) . Industries that require such intermediate inputs will typically rely more heavily on formal enforcement of contracts in courts because the scope for hold-ups is higher. Figure 7 shows that the materials share in these industries is more dispersed and has a fatter left tail. This is consistent with firms reducing their intermediate input use when frictions in the markets for relationshipspecific inputs increase their cost of production. The figure shows the percentage deviation of a plant's materials share from its 5-digit industry mean. The sample is divided into industries whose expenditure share on relationshipspecific inputs at the national level is above the median (red) and below the median (blue). The classification of relationship-specificity is from Rauch (1999) .
B.2 Distortions and International Sourcing
This section presents three tables describing how plants' usage of domestically-and foreign-sourced inputs varies with distortions. The fourth row of Table XI shows that, relative to those in industries that tend to use standardized inputs, the expenditure shares on domestic inputs of plants in industries that use relationshipspecific inputs declines as courts get more congested. The second row of Table XI shows that this estimated relationship is stronger when we use our instrumental variables strategy with court age as an instrument for congestion. Table XII shows the same regressions but with the cost share of imported intermediates. Here, the OLS and IV specifications point to opposite results, and further investigation is required. The OLS specifications indicate that among those that rely more on more relationship-specific inputs, more congestion leads to lower shares of imported inputs relative to those that rely on standardized inputs. The IV specification indicates that more congestion leads to relatively higher imported input shares in those that rely on relationship-specific inputs, indicating that firms respond to distortions by substituting from domestic to foreign suppliers. Table XIII shows the results on the share of imports in the basket of relationship-specific (first three columns) and homogenous (last three columns) inputs. More congestion leads to a higher share of imports in both baskets, but the substitution is stronger in the basket of relationship-specific goods. (1) and (2) (resp. (3) and (4)) is the share of relationshipspecific (homogeneous) imports in total relationship-specific (homogeneous) materials. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01 that this appears to be the direct impact of the distortions rather than the indirect of distortions on size or age. 
B.3 Distortions and Markups
B.5 Controlling for Fractionalization
Tables XVII, XVIII, and XIX show the main regressions of input mixes and vertical distance with a full set of controls. 
B.7 Results
The regressions in Table XX 
Years after creation of new bench
The figure shows the evolution of the share of relationship-specific inputs in sales, in treated districts relative to non-treated districts. Treatment happens at the start of period 0. Regression includes firm × product fixed effects and year dummies. • Materials expenditure in total cost: (as used in Table I and subsequent tables) Total expenditure on intermediate inputs which are associated with a product code (that excludes services and most energy inputs) divided by total cost (see above).
• Pending High Court cases: From Daksh India (www.dakshindia.org). Daksh collects and updates pending cases by scraping High Court websites. Cases were retrieved on 11 June 2017. To eliminate biases resulting from possible delays in the digitisation, we exclude all cases that were filed after 1/1/2017. We divide cases into civil and criminal based on state-specific case type codes (which are part of the case identifiers), and a correspondence between case types and whether they are civil or criminal cases (from High Courts, where available).
• Rauch classification of goods: From James Rauch's website, for 5-digit SITC codes. Concorded from SITC codes to ASIC via the SITC-CPC concordance from UNSTATS, and the NPCMS-ASIC concordance from the Indian Ministry of Statistics (NPCMS is based on CPC codes).
• Dependence on relationship-specific inputs, by industry: (as used in Table I ) Total expenditure of single-product plants in an industry on relationship-specific inputs (according to the concorded Rauch classification), by 3-digit industry, divided by total expenditures on intermediate inputs that are associated with a 5-digit product code (which excludes services and most energy intermediate inputs).
• Gross domestic product per capita, by district District domestic product was assembled from various state government reports, for the year 2005 (to maximize coverage). Missing for Goa and Gujarat and some union territories, and for some individual districts in the other states. Population data from the 2001 and 2011 Census of India, interpolated to 2005 assuming a constant population growth rate in each district. Whenever district domestic product per capita was unavailable, we used gross state domestic product per capita, as reported by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation.
• Population density, by district: population and district size from the 2001 Census of India.
• Vertical Distance to Output: See Appendix E.
• Labor Regulations: From the STICERD/EOPP Indian States website (as constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004) ). The labor regulations variable is "1" if the number of pro-worker amendments to the IDA exceeds the number of pro-employer amendments, "0" if the number of pro-worker and proemployer amendments is equal, or no amendments were passed, and "-1" if the state passed more pro-employer amendments than pro-worker amendments.
• Trust: Fraction of respondents that answer "Most people can be trusted" in the World Value Survey's trust question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Data from waves 4, 5, and 6 of the World Values Survey, except for Himachal Pradesh, Puducherry, and Uttarakhand, which are only available in wave 6. Data is missing for Goa and the UT's, except for Delhi and Puducherry.
• Language: Data on population by mother tongue in each state, from the 2001 Census of India, as published by the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner.
• Caste: Data on caste from the 2014 round of CMIE's Consumer Pyramids Survey (as made available by ICPSR), covering all states of India except the northeastern states and the UT's of Andaman and Nicobar, Lakshadweep, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu. Observations have been weighted to be representative at the level of a "homogeneous region", which is "a set of neighbouring districts that have similar agro-climatic conditions, urbanisation levels and female literacy" (CPS 2014 User guide). Data covers 364 castes and caste categories. Herfindahls are constructed at the level of a homogeneous region, and mapped to districts. 27
C.2 Sample
For the linear regressions in Section 2, the sample consists of all plants are reported as operating, produce a single 5-digit product, and have materials shares of output strictly between zero and two. We also drop the few observations from the Seven Sister States in North East India (Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura; Arunachal Pradesh is not covered by the ASI) because they have a different sampling methodology in the ASI, and Jammu and Kashmir, because coverage of its court cases is inadequate, and because many federal laws do not apply to it due to its special status within the union. For the structural estimation, we also remove observations where the shares of relationship-specific materials, homogeneous materials, or labor in sales exceed two, and observations where sales or non-materials expenditures are non-positive. 27 We are grateful to Renuka Sané and CMIE for helping us to get a description of the homogeneous regions.
C.3 Details on High Court and State creation
where λ : A n ωω → R, λ(ω (0) , ω (1) , . . . , ω (n) ) = n i=1 β {(ω (0) ,ω (1) ,...,ω (i−1) )} ω (i−1) ω (i)
is the share of ω in ω's input mix through a given product chain. Hence, δ ωω is the average number of production steps between an output ω and an input ω , weighted by the overall expenditure of each product chain in industry ω's mix of materials, and excluding any circular product chains. The plant-level measure of vertical integration, and the left-hand side of Table II , is then the average distance of its inputs from the output, weighted by each inputs' share in the plants materials expenditure: let j ∈ J ω , then Table XXII shows the average vertical distance of several input groups (defined as all inputs that contain the strings "fabric"/"cloth", "yarn", or "cotton, raw" in their description") from the output "cotton shirts". Fabrics and cloths are closest to the final output; yarns, which are used in the production of cloths and fabrics, are further upstream, and raw cotton inputs are even further upstream. Table XXIII shows vertical distances between aluminium ingots as an output, and several intermediate inputs. Aluminium ingots can be made both by recycling castings and alloys, but also by casting molten aluminium. The latter also serves as an intermediate input in the production of castings and alloys, and is hence vertically more distant than the inputs which undergo recycling. Aluminium itself is produced from aluminium oxide using electrolytic reduction (Hall-Heroult process). In turn, aluminium oxide is produced by dissolving bauxite in caustic soda at high temperatures (hence the coal inputs). 
E.2 Examples
